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After the downfall of President Soeharto and New Order regime in 1998, an Islamist groups 
or known as new religious movement –Hizbuth Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) – sprung up, calling 
for Islamization of society. Although, approximately 88 per cent of indonesia’s 255 million 
people are Muslims, according to Islamist new movement’s perception , this country has been 
ruled under secular values. Moreover, mostly Indonesian muslims practicing Islam have been 
influenced to secular values also tradition. Muslims’ way of life should be restored to the 
authenthic Islam which return to the the first age of Islam represented by Prophet Muhammad 
and The Companion (Khulafaur Rasyidin).  In attempting to build an original identity of 
Islam for Indonesian Muslims, HTI employeed both media and oral communication. 
 
This study aimed to describe the process of building Islam identity and the use of 
communication has been done by the Hizbuth Tahrir Indonesia. To examine the research,  the 
theoretical framework of identity and religious communication was applied.  
Methodologically, a single case was used in this research to describe the implementation of 
religious communication and the building identity process. Data will be collected through in-
depth interviews, and focus group discussions. Multiple sources of data are used to construct 
triangulation strategies to ascertain the validity of the data.  
 




Discussions of the awakening of Islam confrontated to West have been very frequent since 
the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 in New York, which destroyed the World Trade 
Center in Manhattan (Baidhawy, 2011, p.41). Furthermore, the rising of Islam’s new 
religious movements in modern times can be perceived as rejection to Western domination ( 
Bamualim, 2008 p.11). Westernisation is another momentum to bring about religious actions, 
because Western civilization is often associated to Christian civilization (Kato, 2011).  Islam 
identity is revived as an alternative civilization as resistance power to Westernisation ( 
Lehman, 1998; al-Makassary,2008). This phenomenon has influenced some Indonesian 
Muslims to establish movement inspired by movements in Middle East. One of the well-
known of religious movement in Indonesia is HTI (Hizbuth Tahrir Indonesia) (Ahnaf, 2009). 
In accordance to HTI’s dissemination in amplyfing their influence, it has been 
underpinned by religious communication circumstances in Indonesia. The tradition of Islamic 
transmission was developed since the 14th, with printed teaching in pre independence blooms 
into the Internet era. Two models of Islamic spreading in Indonesia present both in oral and 
written forms (Muzzaki, 2009). Then, according to Patrick McCurdy (2013, p. 59), the rise of 
information and communication technologies (ICT) and social media has unquestionably 
increased the opportunities for Islam’s new movements to challenge the monopoly of 
Western power. It has provided movements with alternate means for mobilization, 
communication and representation. 
However, HTI as an Islam’s new religious movement’s facing a phenomenon which 
shows that Islam in Indonesia is not monolithic teaching or –ism. Kuntowijoyo (1987) argued 
that Islam in Indonesia has been influenced by traditional habits. Furthermore, it transformed 
into divergent identities, such as traditional Islam (Kejawen), modernis Islam, and sufism 
Islam (mysticism)(Qodir,2011, p.164).  Dealing with such divergence , Islam’s new religious 
movement  focuses on the convertion of Indonesian  Muslims to adopt their belief which 
what they believe as “authentic” Islam (Hamid, 2009). This issue of diferentiation in 
practicing Islam become main challenge for Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia to unity a meaning that  
authentic Islam’s identity should be based on Syari’a (Islamic Law).  
This study will focus on the extent to which religious communicaton within Hizbut 
Tahrir Indonesia (HTI)  constructs religious identity and to convert Indonesian Muslims’ 
beliefs   to Salafi  that calls for the Muslim community to return to Islam as it was in its first 
stage (the period of Prophet Muhammad and the Companion/Sahabat) and accepting  a 
Caliphat   (a form of Islamic government ruled by a caliph—a political and religious 
successor to Muhammed), instead of employing Western system.  To investigate this, first, a 
case study research design will be used to analyse how religious identity has been established 
among Indonesian Muslims, both the member of Hizbuth Tahrir Indonesia (HTI )in 
Jogjakarta and non-members during the introduction of a Caliphat by HTI. Second, 
theoretical perspective of identity and religious communication will be employed to examine 
this study.  
 
Definition of New Religious Movement 
Before discussing the topic further, some parameters for the key terms are used in this 
paper; that is, new religious movement. In  his book, Understanding New Religious 
Movements, John A. Saliba (1996) characterizes three different ways in which different 
groups have sought to define new religions. The first way is with theology, which focuses on 
whether a religious group’s claims to offer salvation are true or false (Wilkins & Chryssides, 
2006, p. 5). 
The second way is with psychology. Cults, for example, are often formed and joined 
by deprived young adults who are seeking satisfaction for their various needs (Saliba, 1996, 
p. 68). The psychological perspective’s main point depends on whether a new religion uses 
mind control or brainwashing (Wilkins & Chryssides, 2006, p. 4). Brainwashing was a 
concept originally developed during the Cold War in order to explain  why apparently normal 
people  could  convert  to communism. Brainwashing theories  offered  a crude,  popularized 
version  of previous  research  on  why   so  many   working-class  Germans  joined   Nazism 
that was carried  out  in  the  1920s by  the  Marxist  Frankfurt Institute for  Social Research 
(Introvigne, 2014 p. 304). 
The third way is with sociology. For instance, Saliba (1996) mentiones that religious 
movements are are related to a milieu’s mainstream religion and/or dominant culture. Unlike 
the second, psychological, way that perceives new religious movement negatively, 
sociologists views new religious movements a response to social phenomenon (Wilkinss & 
Chryssdales, 2006, p.5). In attempt to define new religious movements, researchers in the 
sociology field use thes term “cult” and “sect” to analyse new religions(Stark, 2003; Wilkins 
& Chryssides, 2006). However, researchers largely agree on how to appropriately apply the 
terms (Wilkins & Chryssides , 2006, p.5). First, a sect is a religious movement in a state of 
relatively high tension with its socio-cultural environment. A sect can be classified as a way 
to reaffirm the conventional religious culture(s) of society in which they appear.  
Meanwhile, Barker (in Bromley, 2007) claims that new religions represent innovation 
rather than a continuation of previous traditions—that they set old traditions in a new context. 
While Bromley (2007) concludes that new religious movemenst exist socially and culturally 
on the fringe, they differ significantly in belief and practice from the dominant religious 
institution of the culture in which they are located and have minimum ties to and allies in that 
society’s dominant government and religious and intellectual structures. 
Another issue of new religious movements is the notion of new. Word “new” refers to 
new religious movements arise question on the meaning of new. Poewe & Hexham( 1989) 
argue that what one perceives to be new is the actually a reaction to one’s and others’ current 
ways of life, to specific tension in their life, and to their specific notion of what constitutes 
salvation (p. 7). Wilkins & Chryssides (2006) define a religious group as new if it came into 
existence in recent times.  
However, some new religious movements also contest with the power relation among 
state and politics. Religion’s increasing political influence coupled with increasing religious 
repression has become a dominant pattern (Robbins, 2004). Studies on new religious 
movements of State’s suppression to China’s Falun Gong  group and  Al Qaeda in Central 
Asia (2004) shows the linkage to political issue. There are often three sources of tension 
between religious movements and the state. Robbins notes that Rosalind Hackett (2004, p. 5) 
wrote that, first, movements may pose a direct challenge to political authority, sometimes in 
tangible military terms. Second, new movements are often viewed as representing a threat to 
public interest; that is, the behavior of group or its devotees or the beliefs being espoused are 
seen as inimical to basic cultural values. Third, new movements may mount challenges to 
previous religions’ power and authority. 
 
The New Religious Movements in the World 
In ninetenth-century, Western countries such as, United State and Europa witnessed 
the surface of religious movements on several forms dramatically (Melton 1978; Barker 
1989; Saliba 1996 ; Wilkins & Chryssides 2006). There are three points that indicate its 
presence. First, numerous Christian revival movements increased and were amplyfied their 
evangelical message. Second, the influence of Eastern philosophical and religious thought in 
the movements (Melton 1987; Saliba 1996). Third, was the appearance of religious or 
churches indegenous to the New World. Mormonism (The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
day Saints)  is the one of example of the succesful new religious movement in this century in 
the West (Saliba, 1996, p.52). Furthermore, more new religious movements has emerged. 
Among the numerous new religious that share similar mission to Mormons as to restore 
modern Christianity known as Jehovah’s Witnesses. Its root comes from the Adventist 
tradition (Wilkins & Chryssides 2006). Unlike Jehovah, in Britain (Baker 1989), the United 
Reformed Church has formed as a union  between the Presbyterian Church of England and 
the Congregational Union of England and Wales in 1972.  Those movements offer some kind 
of answer of  a religious, spiritual and philosophical question. 
Most of religion experience numerous new movements. Some will be formed  by 
disgruntled  members   who  withdrew   from  older  religious  bodies. Others   will  be  
born   because   someone   created   or  discovered  new   religious culture   and   
convinced    others   of  its  authenticity ( Stark, 1996). The novelty of this movement can 
be recognized from the way of religious movements deliberatelly seek innovation of their 
previous tradition. The Sokka Gakkai International (SGI) has different worship to the 
tradition of Buddhism and The Family Federation for the World Peace and Unification 
(FFWPU) which bases its teachings on new revelation afforded to its founder-leader 
(Wilkins&Chryssides, 2006, p.4).  
However, the notion of “new” for this movements has been denied by some religious 
movements. In some cases, what the newness consist of is argueable. The International 
Society for Khrisna Conciousnes (ISKCON) argues their to be the oldest and a religious 
tradition in the world (Barker 1989, p.147), return to Khrisna, whom it convinces to have 
lived in the third millennium BCE in Vrindaban in North India. In Buddhism, the Soka 
Gakkai Internatonal (SGI) claims to going back to the thirteenth-century Buddhist teacher 
Nichiren (1222-82). Some of new religious movements believes to be old by being 
‘restorationists’ (Wilkins&Chryssides,2006). The Mormons ( The Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-day Saints), The Jehovah’s Witnesses  claim to follow the form of the first-century 
Church try to restore mainstream Christianity (p.4).  
Meanwhile, in Islamist  movements, the core goal is to create a society governed and 
guided by shari’a or Islamic law (Wictorowicz, 2004 , p. 203). Zeiden (2001) categorizes 
Islamist movements into several currents: that is, revivals that have recurred throughout 
Muslim history, religious reform movements with political agendas that emerge as a 
counterattack against secularism and the agenda of Islamic states based on the Shari`a. Still, 
methods differ between moderate gradualists and radical revolutionaries. 
Saliba (1996) wrotes new religious movement’s beliefs and practices has been reacted 
negatively. It has been condemned as a system that introduces heresy. Hostily to alternatif 
religious reflected on some discrimination (Robbins & Lucas, 2004), such as labelled to be 
deviant, even radicalist for some new religious movements, specially for Islamic groups. 
Another way in which discrimination occurs to some kind of registration or licencing to be 
legal organization. In China, unregistered Protestant Evangelical; the Salvation Army 
organization in Russia, have been underpressured by State (p.21), also Hizbth Tahr was 
banned in Yordania (Qodir, 2006). 
 
New Religious Movements in Indonesia 
New religious movements emerged because Muslim countries across the world, such 
as Indonesia, were becoming modernized and adopting democracy, leading to corruption and 
oppression of human rights, pluralism, and social justice (Hashemi, 2009, p. 134). In the 
Indonesian case, democracy and secularization have resulted in openness to freedom of 
expression but, conversely, a rise in poverty and corruption. Multidimensional crises such as 
weak enforcement of the law, increasing poverty, and more expensive fuel for transportation 
are causing despair among Indonesian people. A decline in the quality of life is causing the 
gap between the rich and the poor to widen (Tempo.co.bisnis, 2013). This situation provides 
a fertile ground for the growth of radical Islamic movements, which utilize this momentum to 
condemn the government for adopting a secular state system. New Islamic organisations 
argue that secularization has created a lot of problems, and therefore offer Islamic Shari’a as 
salvation. This is a phenomenon that Bourdieu called “symbolic violence” (Jenkins, 2002, p. 
104) where the Islamists try to impose the purification of Islam on Indonesian Muslims. The 
imposition of this idea is essential to Islamism movements because, as Eliraz (2004) states, 
“the idea of the implementation of Shari’a, which is also essential to the world-view of 
radical Islamists in Indonesia, is tightly connected with fundamentalist perception of an 
Islamic state”(p.69). 
The unsolved problems that Muslims face lead to wide opportunities for Islamic 
fundamentalists to challenge Westerners’ and Islamic modernists’ domination (Davidson, 
2003, p. 12) because Western and Islamic modernist promises to bring prosperity, 
democracy, human rights, and resource distribution have proven illusory. Ironically, the 
Western program creates authoritative governments and a small prosperous group, with the 
worst result being the fading of the Islamic culture and tradition (Davidson, 2003, p. 11; 
Ahmad, 1993, pp. 460-462; Nash, 1993, pp. 691–739).  
In 1998, after the overthrow of Indonesian President Soeharto, fundamentalist groups 
became engaged in both cultural and political change through, respectively, Islamic social 
organisations and political parties. Rahmat (2005) wrote that the shift from oppression to 
freedom of expression has encouraged Islamic movements to increasingly express their 
Islamic culture. Meanwhile, there are at least two prominent accommodation patterns that 
exist in shaping Islamic culture. The first pattern is cultural accommodation, which consists 
of an adoption of Islamic cultural expressions, such as wearing a koko shirt or males wearing 
a headband (sorban). The second pattern is legislative accommodation, which incorporates 
aspects of Islamic law into state law for Muslims. For example, in marriage law, Muslims are 
prohibited from marrying people from other religions. Consequently, the face of Indonesian 
Islam changed at the end of the 1990s. In social life, Islamist new religious groups introduced 
different nuances in behaviour, purely following the way of life of the Prophet Muhammad 
and his Sahabat (companions). For example, fundamentalist groups have their own 
characteristic features such as physical appearance and the manner of dress. The typical male 
wardrobe is to keep a beard, wear gamis (trousers above the ankles and a blouse), and an 
Arabic headband (sorban). Conversely, the women wear clothing that covers their faces and 
whole bodies except for the palms of their hands. As for the relationship between men and 
women in daily life, fundamentalist groups prohibit the mingling of the sexes (Rahmat, 2005; 
Sattar, 2013).  
When Abdurrahman Wahid, the successor of President Habibi, was replaced by 
President Megawati in 2001, the tension among Indonesian Muslims escalated. Azra (2003) 
argued that the most visible challenges for President Megawati came from Muslim hard-liner 
groups, such as Front Pembela Islam (FPI), Laskar Jihad, Hizbut-Tahrir, and other smaller 
groups. These groups are known for their refusal to accept President Megawati because of her 
gender. According to them, a woman leading a country contradicts the teachings of Islam. 
Furthermore, these groups accused President Megawati of taking the side of the United 
States. Muslim hard-liners regarded her silence on the U.S. military strikes in Afghanistan as 
reflecting her unfriendly attitude towards Islam and Muslims. After Megawati resigned in 
2004, President Soesilo Bambang Yoedhoyono (SBY) from the Democratic Party, took on 
the leadership with the conviction that a democratic system is the right path for governing 
Indonesia. During his leadership, the resurgence of Islamic fundamentalists who highlighted 
the purification of Islam was known as the “New Wave of Islam Movement”, which began to 
establish its cultural approach to Muslims (Rahmat, 2005). 
 
 
Identity and Religious Communication 
 
It is important to recognise there are various definitions of identity which stemming from 
different sources. Identity is multidimensional; it continually exists, it is experienced, and it is 
negotiated within people’s lives. In term of opposing secular, Castells (2010, p.8) referred to 
identity as resistance from actors who are in position marginalized. The discussion of identity 
is linked to one of the predisposition of  new religious movements as an ideological 
movement which seek for recognition. Recent approaches to identity have been grown from 
sociological perspectives, which argue that: 
 
Identity is both “internal” and “external” to the individual. It is internal to the extent 
that it is seen to be subjectively “constructed” by the individual, but it is external to 
the extent that this construction is in reference to “objective” social circumstances 
provided by day-to-day interactions, social roles, cultural institutions, and social 
structures (Côté & Levine, 2002, p. 49).  
 
Although these statements may be appropriate recognised when applied to social identities, 
such as race, ethnicity, and nationality, they are no less true of personal identity, which 
“[denotes] the more concrete aspects of individual experience rooted in interactions” (Côté & 
Levine, 2002, p. 8). 
Du Gay and Hall (1996) explained that the definition of  identity as the way people 
identify themselves within a cultural context. A broad consensus that the term identity 
ascociated to an individual’s subjective rather than objective react to the world in which they 
live, or the experiences they choose for themselves in their world. Bauman (2004) stated that 
identity has generally been analysed as a subjective response that includes a strong feeling of 
belonging at a group level, where individuals within the group have an identity that also 
identifies with others in the group.  
In this study, religious communication was employed to analyse how identity has 
been constructed. Religious communication theories assume that the meaning and purpose of 
life derive a faith tradition grounded in scriptures (holy books), doctrines (collective 
teachings and beliefs) and communal religious experiences. This theories emphasizes on the 
persuasive purposes of influencing the minds and hearts of audience to belief in God, 
inspiring moral actions based on those beliefs, and cultivating a religious consciousness and 




In this research, a case study was used as a research strategy. A case study, as Yin 
argues, enables the researcher to capture real-life events in a holistic and meaningful way 
(2003, 9). The use of a case study in this research is based on three requirements proposed by 
Yin.  The first requirement is that the type of question asked should be ‘how’ and ‘why’ a 
contemporary set of events takes place: why are certain decisions taken, how do they come 
about, and what consequences do they entail. Secondly, the researcher has little or no control 
over the events studied; and thirdly, a contemporary phenomenon in its real-life context 
becomes the focus of the study (2003, 13). Some questions require explanatory answers that 
“deal with operational links needing to be traced over time, rather than merely frequencies or 
incidence” (2003, 6). Moreover, this research will investigate the phenomenon (community 
access point projects) that is embedded in the full complexity of its real-world settings which 
is inseparable from human and social context. The focus of this study also deals with 
contemporary events (the launch of Islam Nusantara concept) which are taking place 
currently. For such reasons, my research fits Yin’s suggestions of suitability for choosing a 
case study as a research strategy. The case study that will be used in this research falls within 
the category of single-case design (Yin 2003, 46) .  
 
 
Building the Identity by Religious Communication 
 
HTI’s messages predominantly analyze the problems of democratic secular societies. 
The HTI has concluded that Indonesia as a state is failing because it is unable to fulfill its 
function of providing prosperity, security, and solutions to disputes in society. The HTI’s 
criticism of the state are not limited to its policies but extends to its adherence to those 
secular functions. It proposes that the only way out is with Shari’a (Ward, 2009, p. 154; 
Ahnaf, 2009, p. 74).  
In attempting to challenging Western domination, Islamic movements try to contest 
the hegemonic power of opponents by establishing religious identity (Meijer, 2009).  The 
goal of Islam’s new religious movement (revivalist puritan organization) is to glory the name 
of Allah by developing an Islamic brotherhood (ukhuwah Islamiyah), including mobilizing 
solidarity against the persecution of Muslims around the world  (Ahnaf, 2006; Yusanto, 2011 
; Qodir, 2013,).One of the member, EA (2015) argued that liberating Muslims from the 
thoughts, systems, and laws of unbelievers will be better for improving Indonesian 
Muslims’life.  He argued that Islam has its own identity, including thoughts, systems and 
law: 
 
Practicing Islam in our country is contaminated with local culture which isn’t 
compatible to Islamic lesson.....Yes, I know that some of muslims have accused us 
adopting Arabic culture due to Islam worship. ..Indeed, we don’t intend to immitate 
Arabic culture... but, in fact, for example, Al Qur’an stated that women should cover 
their body wearing veil or well known as to cover our aurat...the definition of aurat is 
clearly explained in Hadist.. Islam has regulated it and it’s an obligation! So... why we 
still deny that hijab is an Islamic outfit?? And accused us adopting Arabic culture? 
(Source : EA, Indepth interview) 
 
Recently, Muslims can easely accesses more information and knowledge of Islam. 
Many Islamic privat schools have been established and affordable to educate children 
for Islamic creed. Only few muslims family join with those kind of schools......or.. 
Yeah..the others don’t want to. So the awareness of the importance to introduce Islam 
lesson since childhood should be strenghtened. The urgence to return to Al Qur’an 
and Hadist as the only guidance in our life. (Source : AN, Indepth interview) 
 
Most of HTI’s member believe that building Islamic nation is urgent. In attempting to 
challenging Western domination, Islamic movements try to contest the hegemonic power of 
opponents by establishing religious identity (Meijer, 2009).  The goal of Islam’s new 
religious movement (revivalist puritan organization) is to glory the name of Allah by 
developing an Islamic brotherhood (ukhuwah Islamiyah), including mobilizing solidarity 
against the persecution of Muslims around the world  (Ahnaf, 2006; Yusanto, 2011 ; Qodir, 
2013,). 
 
However, HTI is very careful not to engage in frontal attacks on the state, especially on the 
crucial aspects of nationalism such as Pancasila (the five pillars of the Indonesian 
constitution) and the Unitary Republic of Indonesia (NKRI) (Ahnaf, 2009, p. 75). As ZA  
(2015) stated : 
 
Of course, we realize many people disagree with our ideas, they provocate or 
discredite us, but we will not respond them aggresively.  
 
Let the provocation dissapear...by the way, it is an advantage for HTI because 
everytime they attack verbally toward us so newspaper or television coverage will 
mention our organization and our struggle....it means free advertising, doesn’t 
it...hehehe (laughing). (Source: EA, Indepth interview) 
 
Ward (2009) describes the HTI as an Islamic revival movement that has chosen the path of 
non-violent action (la maadiyah). It is an unusual attitude to hold for a group with radical 
tendencies. In fact, HTI has declared to eschew violence to achieve its principal goal, 
although its strategy is to focus on a blend of radical ideology, sarcastic rhetoric, and non-
violence. Like other groups, HTI also advocates implementing Shari’a in daily life. 
According to the members, Islam is not just a religion but also a political system (al-din wa 
al-dawlah). Therefore, the group’s most important objective is to establish an Islamic 
khilafah (caliphate). The group idealizes one government for all Muslims across the world 
that mirrors the one that formed during the era of the Prophet and his companions  (Ahnaf, 
2009). This implies that Muslims should not be divided by numerous state boundaries and 
that they should be ruled by one khilafah. Unsurprisingly, this group rejects the idea of 
nationalism or the nation-state. To illustrate the idea in which member understand to Islamic 
identity, a comment by a member, initially as ZA (2015) : 
 
Majority of Indonesian population is muslims...almost 90% from 250 million people... 
but why their way of life don’t adopt Islamic guideline? We have already had a 
guidance from Allah SWT, ...Muslims should follow AlQur’an and Hadist to 
lightening their way..why still mingle with tradition rituals? ...hmm...I believe they 
also have been infiltrated by secularisme values, could be from media  
 
In accordance to building  the pure Islam identity, th HTI also believe to restore the nation 
back to the  Caliph era. To gain the goal, there are three stages (marhalah) of struggle that the 
HTI  applies (Ahnaf, 2009, p. 80).  The first stage is the forming of cadres (marhalah tas’qif). 
The second is the socialising stage, in which the idea of an Islamic state is presented to the 
Muslim community (marhalah tafa’ul ma’a al-ummah). During this stage, the cadres interact, 
educate, and answer numerous social questions from the community, based on the AlQur’an 
and the Hadith, to lead Muslims to believe that their only salvation is Islam. As EA (2015) 
explained : 
 
...through our news online, eramuslim.com, we can disseminte our opinion, ideas. 
Yes, everybody can visit our website... 
 
It is important for us to keep discussing about actual issu related to Islam practicing... 
oh yeah.. for routine religious meeting (pengajian), we focus on our internal group. 
Well,...people don’t want to joint our pengajian.   
 
Then, Islamist movement, like the HTI use the media especially Internet or new 
media to build up effective communication network and to spread information and 
propaganda (Brauchler 2004; Lym 2005; Khondker 2011). However, Azakki (2010) in his 
articles, in the book Televangelista & Zealous in Media, argues that the practices of public 
preaching and sermons still played role in propagating teaching, although he emphasize only 
on the Islamic transmission in television. Despite the use of media for transmitting 
fundamentalists belief and idea, it is usuall in Indonesia to mobilizised people to conduct 
religious events. As ZA (2015) mentioned: 
 
We avoid using mainstream mass media, namely television or commercial 
film...secularist goverment won’t allow us employed those channel. Another 
communication form, such as liqo (class), pengajian (routine religious meeting), 
political discourse discussions will be used to communicate our ideas...every week we 
have such kind of activities. We can keep maintaining our solidarity, sharing our 
experiences and even supporting our friends dealing with their problems. 
 
Or...for example, when an important issue emerged, such as pornography...we 
approach housewifes or women mobilizing them to engaged with our action against 
pornography... It is important to have a non violent mobilization.... we didn’t force 
them lho...hehehe 
(Source : EA, Indepth interview) 
 
Osman (2010) writes that, unlike other fundamentalist groups, the HTI believes that 
women have a role to play in an Islamic state. The HTI claims that males and females have 
equal rights to create the caliphate. The organization abandons representing women of the 
fundamentalist gender ideology, which places women in the domestic sphere. When women 
are used to personify tradition, they are disempowered from engaging in activities outside the 
home and family (Hardacre, 1993). In the contrary,the Hizbt Tahr in Indonesia 
accommodates women’s participation. As EA (2015) explained: 
 
women members have opportunity to publish their own booklets and websites, and 
they attend international Khilafah conferences. Clearly, the HTI believes that the 
women have the right to participate in supporting their struggle. 
 
Finally, the third stage consists of replacing the government (marhalah istilam al-hukm). 
  
Conclusion 
Identity of mainstream Indonesian muslim has no longer following “the authentic” Islam, 
which what Hizbth Tahr Indonesia (HTI) believes should be practice as to Prophet 
Muhammad and Sahabat / Khulafaur Rasyidin (the Companion) era.  For HTI, the pure of 
Islam only based on AlQur’an and Hadist without adding some innovations influenced by 
cultural aspects or tradition. Religious communication are applied to educate Indonesian 
muslims and focuses on the redifine religious beliefs and religious practices. The HTI 
constructs Islam identity  by restoring the meaning and religious beliefs refers to  first stage 
of Islam. 
 
In building Islamic identity among Indonesian  Muslims, Hizbuth Tahr using both oral 
communication and media. The HTI has highlighted and maintained oral communication for 
restoring identity, although social media, such as news online (eramuslim.com), facebook are 
frequently employed. The ultimate goal of the HTI is to establish Islamic State. However, the 
Hizbt Tahr Indonesia (HTI) avoids confrontating to goverment in persuading Indonesian 
Muslims of the importance of a Caliphate (Khalifah). Ironically, in this information age, 
now, the HTI also take advantage from the democratic system adopted by Indonesia 
goverment. The system that guarantee of freedom of speech and expression. The political 
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